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Abstract
We provide empirical support and a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of
political corruption and tax evasion in which countries often fall into. We address
this issue in the context of a model with two distinct groups of agents: citizens and
politicians. Citizens decide the fraction of their income for which they evade taxes.
Politicians decide the fraction of the public budget that they peculate. We show
that multiple self-fullling equilibria with di¤erent levels of corruption can emerge
based on the existence of strategic complementarities, indicating that corruption
may corrupt. Furthermore, we nd that standard deterrence policies cannot elimi-
nate multiplicity. Instead, policies that impose a strong moral cost on tax evaders
and corrupt politicians can lead to a unique equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Corruption and the misuse of government revenue often provide the moral justication for
tax evasion. Indeed, corruption and tax evasion are often highly persistent and correlated.
For example, there seems to be little disagreement to the claim that the current Greek
economic tragedy is a play that involves both of these issues. In fact, as two Greek
economists have written in a recent article:
We contend that a crucial factor in this respect, and which has been steadily
eroding the foundations of Greek society and will impact on the resolution
of the current scal crisis, is the interdependence between the tax burden,
public good provision, tax compliance . . . The rise of budget decits during the
last three decades reects in addition to outright corruption, the increasing
inability of the public sector to deliver on the public goods and services that
the higher-taxed citizens . . . have every right to expect in return. This has
created a further legitimization of tax evasion . . . (Moutos and Tsitsikas
2010, p. 173)
Political corruption, evidenced by a series of scandals, together with massive tax evasion
and low quality of public services have been the case in Greece for at least the last three
decades. This extensive corruption has resulted in a decline in social capital, a mutual
distrust between citizens and the government and a social legitimization of tax evasion
and bribery.1 We view the situation that existed in Greece prior to the onset of the
current crisis a typical example of what we analyze in the rest of the paper.
The aim of this paper is to focus on the role of norms in fostering corruption and tax
evasion. We argue that various manifestations of corruption may coexist and reinforce
each other. The corrupt behavior of one group may become a strategic complement for
another. In such a context, whenever agents expect other agents to be corrupt, they
always nd it optimal to be corrupt as well. An example of such a vicious circle is that
1Currently, the country ranks 80th among 177 countries, with a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in
2013 of 4.0. Moreover, according to the 4th wave of the World Values Survey: a) 37.1% of the respondents
agree with the statement It is never justiable to cheat on taxes; b) 64.4% agree with the statement It
is never justiable accepting a bribe; c) 23.7% agree with the statement Most people can be trusted;
d) 85.7% have no condence in civil services; These numbers di¤er substantially from those in other
countries, even with a similar CPI, e.g., India and China. For further details, see Litina and Palivos
(2013).
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of widespread political corruption and high tax evasion, which will be the focus of the
paper.
Analytically, we construct a model economy that comprises two distinct groups of
agents: private citizens and politicians. Citizens decide how much of their income to
report to the tax authorities, taking into account the exogenously given probability of
inspection and the size of the delinquent tax penalty. A certain fraction of tax revenue is
supposed to be spent for the provision of a public good. Politicians, on the other hand,
have the opportunity to peculate a certain fraction of the public funds that are earmarked
for the public good. Crucially, each agent cares not only about her own consumption but
also about the quantity/quality of the public good.
In such a context strategic complementarities may arise, leading to multiple self-
fullling equilibria: a good(bad) equilibrium with low (high) corruption, low (high)
percentage of tax evasion and a high (low) share of output spent on the public good.
The existence of multiple equilibria can help us understand why countries with similar
background are characterized by di¤erent levels of corruption and tax evasion. It can also
provide some insights as to why these two phenomena are so di¢ cult to eradicate.
We then examine the use of standard deterrence policies not only as a means to ght
corruption and tax evasion, but also as a policy device to select an equilibrium in general.
We show that in the presence of multiple equilibria driven by strategic complementarities
in corrupt activities, standard policies, such as nes, are not very e¤ective. The reason is
that whereas standard deterrence policies may increase the cost of tax evasion, they are
unsuccessful in terminating the strategic complementarity between groups.
Next we modify the model to study alternative compliance schemes. In particular,
we assume a social stigma cost associated with being involved in corrupt activities, i.e.,
individuals who commit unlawful actions and get caught are stigmatized by the society.2
If this social cost is su¢ ciently high, then the multiplicity of equilibria is eliminated and
the economy converges to a unique equilibrium. The intuition behind the success of
social policies lies in that they e¤ectively address the strategic complementarity aspect of
corruption.
Our analysis contributes to di¤erent strands of the literature. First, it provides a
theoretical framework that can account for the following empirical facts. Existing evidence
suggests that there is a positive correlation between corruption and tax evasion. The two
2There is an extensive literature that assumes the presence of a social stigma cost; see Section 5 below.
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of them often coexist and reinforce each other (Amudnsen 1999; Barreto and Alm 2003).
Moreover, there seems to be a negative correlation between any of these two phenomena
and spending on publicly provided goods, such as education and health (see, e.g., Mauro
1995, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).3
Second, it contributes to the literature emphasizing the importance of social cost
policies. Our analysis suggests that social policies are particularly useful in the presence
of multiple equilibria as an equilibrium selection mechanism, since they can give an end
to strategic complementarity in corrupt activities. Examining the role of moral costs in
the context of tax evasion and corruption is motivated by the following empirical facts.
Graetz and Wilde (1985) and Skinner and Slemrod (1985) have empirically estimated
the compliance rates of various countries and have found them signicantly higher than
expected, taking into account low auditing probabilities and nes. Also, taking into
account that in most countries audits are not very extensive, e.g., the average audit rate for
individual tax returns in the US is less that 1% (McCa¤ery and Slemrod, 2004), the rate of
tax compliance is estimated to be rather high.4 Most models cannot account for these high
rates unless they introduce some form of moral considerations (e.g., Sandmo 2005; Alm
and Torgler 2011). Moreover, a number of experimental studies have indicated that some
people never evade or they evade less than expected (Alm et al. 1992). Another strand
of the related literature has highlighted the fact that countries with similar scal systems
and deterrence policies experience di¤erent levels of compliance. Many researchers have
argued that, to account for these observations, one must introduce some form of moral
costs related to tax evasion (see Lewis 1979, for the United Kingdom; Alm et al. 1995, for
the US; Alm and Torgler 2006, for the US and Europe). Among the main conclusions are
that non-evading individuals are the ones that view tax evasion as immoral as well as that
individuals who have friends that evade taxes tend to evade more themselves (see Alm et
al. 2013). In addition, the literature nds that in societies with a stronger feeling of social
cohesion, tax compliance is higher as well as that social norms are a crucial determinant
for tax evasion.
3Mauro (1995) reports that a decrease in corruption by 1.5 units in the BI corruption index could
increase spending on education up to 0.6%.
4Rates of tax evasion in most western developed countries are estimated around 5%-25% of potential
tax revenue (Pyle, 1989; Thomas, 1992). In developing countries, tax evasion rates are higher (Tanzi and
Shome, 1994).
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To uncover empirically the nexus between political corruption and tax evasion, we use
individual survey data from the World Values Survey and the General Social Survey. More
specically, the empirical section of the paper is developed in two parts. The rst part
of the analysis establishes a positive correlation between individual attitudes on whether
or not it is justiable to cheat on taxes and the level of perceived political corruption.
Analytically, our empirical ndings suggest that the higher the level of political corruption
(as perceived by citizens) the more justiable they nd it to cheat on taxes. Thus, in line
with the theory, our empirical ndings conrm the presence of an interaction between
the attitudes of the two groups. Causality runs both ways and therefore this section does
not yet address the issue of endogeneity; it just highlights the interaction between the
two groups. The analysis controls for a number of individual characteristics as well as for
country and World Values Survey round xed e¤ects.
In the second part of the analysis, we seek to mitigate the issue of endogeneity and to
make sure that the suggested correlation does not pick up the e¤ect of any unobservables.
Thus, we adopt the so-called epidemiological approach and extend our analysis to a sample
of migrants who currently reside in the US.5 Our ndings suggest that higher (mean)
levels of perceived political corruption in the origin country have a persistent e¤ect on
individual attitudes of migrants towards tax evasion in the US (the host country). We
carefully select our sample to include only second and third generation migrants in order
to address concerns about selective migration and endogeneity. Since all our migrants
were born in the US and are faced with the same sociopolitical environment, we have
netted out the potential e¤ect of the residence country. Moreover, since these migrants
have no systematic interaction with the country of origin of their parents, other than their
parentsculture, we can safely argue that the issue of endogeneity has been e¤ectively
suppressed (see Fernandez and Fogli 2009). Reassuringly, our results further conrm the
interaction between attitudes towards political corruption and tax evasion, an interaction
that is not driven by unobservables or reverse causality.6
5The same approach is applied, for example, in Guiso et al. (2006) for the role of culture, Giuliano
(2007) for living arrangements in Western Europe, Alesina and Giuliano (2010) for the role of family in
inuencing economic behavior and attitudes, Fernandez and Fogli (2009) for fertility and Bentzen (2013)
for religiousness of second generation migrants.
6The persistent e¤ect of preferences at the home country on migrants attitudes has also been es-
tablished in the context of preferences for redistribution and environmental preferences (Luttmer and
Singhal, 2011; Litina et al., 2014).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the benchmark
model that poses the problem and describes the emergence of multiple equilibria and
the e¤ects of corruption in a society without deterrence policies. Section 3 introduces
standard enforcement policies and highlights their limited e¤ectiveness in the ght against
corruption. Section 4 describes the functioning of a moral-based society and demonstrates
why imposing an ethical cost on corrupt activities e¤ectively deters corruption. In Section
5, we presents our empirical ndings. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the results and draws
conclusions.
2 The Benchmark Model
2.1 The economy
Consider an overlapping generations economy where individuals live for two periods.7 The
population size remains constant. In the rst period of life, all agents are identical. They
enter the public education system and acquire human capital according to the learning
technology
ht+1 = vHt + AEt; (1)
where t = 0; 1; 2 : : : indexes time and ht+1 denotes the level of human capital of an
individual born in period t; this level of human capital is formed in period t; but it is
put to use in period t + 1: Moreover, Ht is the average stock of human capital at time t
and Et denotes public spending on education.8 The human capital accumulation process
described by equation (1) shares common features with several papers in the literature;
see, among others, De Gregorio and Kim (2000), Ceroni (2001), Palivos and Varvarigos
(2010, 2013). Accordingly, a young agent, who was born in period t, can pick up a
fraction v 2 [0; 1] of the existing (average) level of human capital Ht without any cost,
simply by observing what the previous generation does.9 The enhancement of an agents
human capital even further is possible only with the use of resources. In this paper, we
7For the sake of concreteness, we choose the publicly provided good to be education, which is usually
nanced by one generation and consumed by another. This is the main reason that we use an overlapping
generations economy.
8Given that the population size is constant, it is inconsequential if E denotes the total spending on
education, the spending per student or some function of it. Similarly, H in (1) could denote the total
instead of the average level of human capital. Whereas these issues can be important in a di¤erent
context, in our framework they bear little signicance.
9The term 1  v can be taken to capture the depreciation rate of the stock of knowledge.
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consider only public education and hence the level of public spending enters the learning
technology. The parameter A > 0 measures the e¢ ciency of the public education system.
Finally, the specic functional form in equation (1) is used purely for convenience; it
allows us to derive analytical expressions.
For simplicity, we assume that agents do not consume in the rst period, or that
their consumption is included in the consumption of their parents. Instead, agents derive
utility from consumption in the second period of their life and from their o¤springs
level of human capital. The latter is meant to capture the idea that parents care about
their o¤springs future prospects and social status (both being enhanced through more
advanced knowledge and/or increased income). Formally, individuals born in period t 1
wish to maximize the following utility function:
ut 1 = ct(ht+1);  2 (0; 1]; (2)
where ct and ht+1 stand for the levels of consumption when old and o¤springs human
capital, respectively. The parameter  measures the strength of the altruistic motive.10
Note that the presence of the o¤springs human capital level in parental utility function
results in an agents vested interest in public education.
At the end of a cohorts rst period of life, a small number of agents emerge via a
random process and become politicians. This group forms the central government, while
the rest of the population remain private citizens. For simplicity, we assume that the
number of politicians is equal to one. The number of private citizens, on the other hand,
is N: When necessary, we use the subscripts c and p to denote variables that are related
to citizens and the politician, respectively.
Citizens
In the second period of their life, private citizens assume production of a single con-
sumption good. Using the appropriate normalization of units, we assume that the wage
rate per unit of human capital is equal to unity and hence each old citizens income is
equal to the (common) level of human capital ht.11 This income is taxed at the rate  ;
which is assumed to be exogenous and time invariant. Nevertheless, citizens have the
10Variations of this utility function abound in the literature; see, for example, Glomm (1997), Ceroni
(2001) and Palivos and Varvarigos (2010, 2013).
11Since all agents have the same level of human capital, we omit the subscript i = c; p from the level
of human capital ht:
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opportunity to tax evade. In particular, we let zt denote the fraction of their income that
they declare to the tax authorities, leading to an amount ztht that is paid as income tax.
Naturally, when it comes to engaging in corrupt activities that inict some form of
punishment, it is expected that involved agents try to conceal their corrupt activities and
the e¤ort to conceal these activities implies an inherent cost. In the case of tax evasion,
the involved cost may imply the cost to hire a practitioner, the cost of bribing the tax
inspector, etc. The idea of transaction costs is not new in the literature. Cowell (1990)
and Chen (2003), among others, assume that tax evasion involves a transaction cost,
which, in general, increases along with the extent of tax evasion. Critically in our model
we make the additional assumption that the transaction cost involved to conceal any
illegal activities relates negatively to the expected overall level of corruption as perceived
by the actions of the reference group, namely the politicians in our model.12 The idea
of this assumption is to capture the fact that in very corrupt societies, where one could
claim that tax evasion has in some sense been legitimized,the e¤ort needed to conceal
corruption is reduced. Put di¤erently, in corrupt societies, where bribery is widespread
among politicians, the cost of evading taxes is lower.
Following the literature, and in particular Cowell (1990) and Chen (2003), we assume
that tax evasion involves a transaction cost, which, in general, increases along with the
extent of tax evasion, the level of income and the level of honesty of the politician. This
cost can be perceived as an e¤ort to conceal tax evasion, e.g., hiring a tax practitioner
(Andreoni et al. 1998). More specically, we assume that the per unit cost of tax evasion
(S) is S = s(1  zt)t; where s > 0 is a xed parameter; 1  z is the degree of tax evasion;
and, as explained in detail below,  denotes the proportion of the education budget that is
actually spent on education; that is, 1 t is the percentage of the education budget that
is embezzled by the politician; hence,  is a measure of how honest the politician is. The
total transaction cost of tax evasion for each agent is then S(1   zt)ht = s(1   zt)2tht;
which is analogous to the expressions found in the literature (see, for example, Chen 2003,
pp. 384-385). Finally, in the benchmark model there are no penalties imposed on tax
evaders. In other words, by paying the transaction cost, agents are able to conceal tax
evasion fully.13
12In a representative agent model, Chen (2003) assumes that the smaller the overall level of corruption
in the economy, the cheaper it is to evade taxes.
13More realistic versions of the model, where nes are imposed on tax evaders, are analyzed in the next
section and in Appendix A.2.
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Politician
The politician receives a payment (net of taxes) from the government budget. In
addition, he has the option to embezzle public funds.14 More specically, he decides what
fraction 1   t of tax revenue to embezzle. In the benchmark model, there is no ne
imposed on the politician, even after he has been found guilty of embezzlement. A more
realistic version is examined in the next section. Still, given the politicians vested interest
in public education, 1   may not be equal to unity (see below).
Spending on Education
The total tax revenue collected within a period t is Rt = NztHt; where z denotes
the average value of z. A constant fraction 1   of this revenue is earmarked for public
sector wages; that is, the politicians net income is equal to (1  )Rt = (1  )NztHt.
The remaining amount NztHt is to be spent on public education. Nevertheless, the
politician peculates a fraction 1   t of this sum. Hence, the actual amount spent on
education Et is
Et = tNztHt: (3)
Evidently, individual optimization decisions regarding zt and t a¤ect total spending on
education and consequently the human capital of generation t:
2.2 Individual optimization
Citizens
As mentioned above, in period t each citizens gross income is ht: A fraction zt of this
is declared to the tax authorities and an amount ztht is paid as income tax. In addition,
an amount st(1 zt)2ht is paid as a transaction cost, to conceal tax evasion. Hence, each
citizens disposable income is
(1  )ztht + (1  zt)ht   st(1  zt)2ht = [(1  zt)  st(1  zt)2]ht:
The individual optimization problem solved by a citizen born in period t  1 is given by
max
cct;zt
ccth

t+1; (4)
14Since most politicians are males, as a mnemonic rule, we use the masculine gender when we refer to
the politician and the feminine when we refer to citizens.
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subject to
cct = [(1  zt)  st(1  zt)2]ht; (5)
cct  0; 1  zt  0;
taking Ht; Et; and t as given.
Maximization yields the citizensbest response function:
zt = f(t) =
8>><>>:
0 if   2s
1  
2st
if  < 2s:
(6)
Inspection of equation (6) reveals that a corner solution zt = 0 will emerge if the tax
rate  is higher than the marginal transaction cost 2st or, equivalently, if the politicians
level of honesty t is below =2s: Note that the corner zt = 1 is never feasible for  > 0
and nite s: Therefore the citizen always nds it optimal to evade a part of her revenue.
Moreover, whenever an interior solution, i.e., 0 < zt < 1; emerges, the tax evasion rate
(1   zt) is positively a¤ected by the size of the tax rate  and negatively by the cost
parameter (s) and, more importantly, the politicians level of honesty (t): Hence, an
increase in the politicians tendency to peculate public funds makes citizens more prone
to tax evasion. In other words, the politicians embezzlement rate is a strategic complement
for citizenstax evasion rate, meaning that zt is an increasing function of t: The result that
the corruption level of one agent may be a strategic complement for another is reminiscent
of the argument that corruption is contagious or, as Andvig and Moene (1990) put it,
corruption may corrupt.
The Politician
The politicians optimization problem is
max
cpt;t
cpth

t+1; (7)
subject to
cpt = (1  t)NztHt; (8)
cpt  0; 1  t  0;
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and equations (1) and (3), taking zt and Ht as given.
Straightforward maximization yields the politicians best response function
t = g(zt) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if NAzt  v
NAzt v
NAzt(1+)
if NAzt [   (1 + )]  v < NAzt
1 if v < NAzt [   (1 + )]:
(9)
Inspection of equation (9) reveals that a corner solution t = 0 (t = 1) will emerge, if
the rate of human capital transferred freely to the next generation, v; is su¢ ciently high
(low). Capturing a large (small) percentage of the existing human capital freely implies
that the politician, as a parent, has a weak (strong) incentive to invest in education and
thus peculates all (none of) the public education funds. Whenever an interior solution
emerges, the embezzlement rate (1   t) is negatively a¤ected by the e¢ ciency of the
education system (A); the tax rate () and the degree of altruism (): On the other hand,
the embezzlement rate is negatively a¤ected by the percentage of the tax revenue that is
earmarked for politicianswages (1 ). In fact, if  > =(1+); then the embezzlement
rate is never zero. This accords well with empirical evidence on the negative relationship
between corruption and wages (Haque and Sahay 1996).
Finally, an increase in the citizensaverage tax evasion rate, (1   zt); increases the
politicians embezzlement rate. Put di¤erently, the private citizensaction is a strategic
complement for the politician, meaning that t is an increasing function of zt:
2.3 Equilibrium
The situation at hand is a coordination game in which there are strategic complementar-
ities. Games of strategic complementarity (see, for example, Cooper and John, 1988 and
Vives, 2005) are those in which the best response of any player, is increasing in the actions
of the rival; this is the case here for zt and t. Strategic complementarity is a necessary
condition for the existence of multiple equilibria in symmetric coordination games. The
occurring equilibria are not driven by fundamentals. Instead, they are self-fullling and
critically depend on the expectations of one group concerning the behavior of the other.
Nevertheless, the game that we analyze here is not a symmetric game. Moreover the choice
space is bounded and this necessitates the consideration of corner solutions. In fact, as
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we show below, this game does not share certain properties of symmetric games with
strategic complementarities. Consider rst the following denition of the equilibrium:
Denition 1. A Nash equilibrium in this economy consists of sequences { cit}1t=0; {zt}
1
t=0;
{t}
1
t=0; {ht}
1
t=0; {Ht}
1
t=0; {Et}
1
t=0; i = c; p, such that, given an initial average stock of
human capital H0 > 0; in every period t = 0; 1; 2;. . . ; 1. Private citizens choose zt to
maximize their utility, taking t; Ht and Et as given 2. The politician chooses t to
maximize his utility, taking zt and Ht as given 3: Ht = ht and zt = zt 8t 4: The sequences
{ht}1t=0; {Et}
1
t=0; and { cit}
1
t=0; are determined according to (1), (3), (5), and (8).
The optimization problem of each agent is well dened since the utility function is
strictly concave and the budget constraint is either convex or linear with respect to the
relevant decision variable, zt or t: In Proposition 1 below, we prove the existence of a pair
(zt; t) that satises Denition 1 in every period. Given the existence of the equilibrium
pair (zt; t); we can easily establish the equilibrium values of the remaining variables,
following Denition 1.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium pair (zt; t) exists:
Proof: All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
We call an equilibrium interior (corner) if it lies in the interior (on the boundary) of
the unit square. Propositions 2 and 3 establish su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a
unique and multiple equilibria, respectively.
Proposition 2. Uniqueness of the equilibrium
a) If v = 0 then (zt; t) = (1  (1+)2s ; (1+)) is the only equilibrium. b) If s = 0; then
(zt; t) = (0; 0) is the only equilibrium. c) If v  A or   2s, then (zt; t) = (0; 0) is
the only equilibrium.
If v = 0 then each new generation born in period t will not acquire any human capital
unless both zt > 0 and t > 0 hold. Thus, the politician commits to a certain strategy
regardless of what the citizens do.15 Since this is the case, citizens nd it optimal not
to evade all of their income and therefore an interior solution emerges. On the contrary
if there is no transaction cost (s = 0); then citizens tax evade their entire income, i.e.,
zt = 0; regardless of the politicians action. In this case the corner (0; 0) emerges.
15In Appendix A.2, we analyze a more general version of the model, where both the politician and the
citizens pay nes if caught having broken the law. Moreover, the revenue from these nes is spent on
public education. We show that, in such a case, strategic complementarity and multiple equilibria can
arise even if v = 0.
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If v is high enough and hence each new generation acquires a substantial level of human
capital freely, then the politician peculates the entire amount ( = 0): Anticipating that,
the citizens set z = 0: This case is illustrated in Figure 1, where the relevant segments
of the best response functions coincide with the axes. Note that, for a given value of
v; the condition specied in part (c) of Proposition 2 can also be expressed in terms
of the tax rate (). For example, if  is too low, then spending on education will be
low no matter how honest the politician is. In this case the politician does not have
any incentive to behave honestly and hence the only equilibrium is (0; 0): This nding is
consistent with the positive correlation between corruption, tax evasion and spending on
education across countries (Mauro 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). Nevertheless, it o¤ers
a di¤erent direction of causality, since spending on education is not low because of high
levels of corruption and tax evasion; instead, corruption and tax evasion are at high levels
because the commitment for education spending is low.
Similarly, if the tax rate is high enough then the citizens tax evade all their income.
This leads again to (0; 0) as the only equilibrium. Finally, note that, by analyzing the
quadratic equation that results from the combination of (6) and (9), it is straightforward,
but tedious, to nd additional conditions, which ensure that that the two best response
functions intersect only at (0; 0); or that they intersect again outside the unit square.
Proposition 3. Multiplicity of equilibria
a) If v > 0 and s > 0 then multiple equilibria may always arise. The occurring equilibria
can be either one corner and two interior or one interior and two corner, depending on
12
the parameter values: b) If v > 0; then (zt; t) = (0; 0) is always an equilibrium. c) If
(2s   )=2s > v=[A(   (1 + )] > 0; then there exist one interior and two corner
equilibria
Figures 2 and 3 show two possible congurations where multiple equilibria arise. Be-
sides the origin, there are two equilibria, which are indicated by the letters A and B. In
Figure 2 there are two corner equilibria and one interior, whereas in Figure 3 there are
two interior and one corner equilibrium.
Again, by analyzing the quadratic equation that results from the combination of (6)
and (9), it is straightforward but cumbersome to nd su¢ cient conditions for the existence
of two interior equilibria or one interior and two corner.
The stability of the equilibria can be characterized using best-reply dynamics; namely,
a Nash equilibrium is said to be stable if, starting from any point in its neighborhood, the
adjustment process in which players take turns myopically playing a best response to each
others current strategies converges to the equilibrium. Using this approach, we can infer
that stability requires that the best response function of the citizen is atter than that of
the politician. Hence, whenever there exist three equilibria, (0; 0) and either one interior
and one more corner or two interior, the equilibrium that lies in the middle is unstable,
while the other two are stable. In sum, there are at most two stable equilibria: (0; 0)
and the high action equilibrium, where there exists low corruption and low tax evasion.
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Consider next the following numerical example.
Example 1. Let A  N = 25;  =  = 0:3; v = 0:03;  = 0:1; s = 0:8: Then there
will be one corner equilibrium (1; z1) = (0; 0) and two interior (2; z2) = (0:219; 0:145);
and (3; z3) = (0:259; 0:277): The middle equilibrium is unstable while the other two are
stable. The utility level of each citizen and the politician in the corner equilibrium and
the high action equilibrium, respectively, will be (u1c; u1p) = (0:704; 0) and (u3c; u3p) =
(0:685; 0:065):
Example 1 serves to show, among others, that in contrast, for example, to Cooper and
John (1988), if there are two stable equilibria, then, in general, they cannot be ranked
in terms of the welfare that they yield. This is attributed to the fact that the game is
non-symmetric. The politician is better o¤ at the low corruption and low tax evasion
equilibrium (3; z3) than under the full corruption and complete tax evasion (0; 0); the
reason is of course that his salary and the amount that he peculates are both a fraction
of the tax revenue. Nevertheless, in this particular example, the citizens prefer the rst
equilibrium, where there is full corruption and complete tax evasion. In general, which
equilibrium they prefer depends on the relative strength of two conicting e¤ects: on the
one hand, high tax evasion increases citizens consumption level, but on the other, it (and
the accompanying high corruption) decreases spending on education and hence future
levels of human capital.
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Next, we examine some comparative statics related to parameter values.
Proposition 4. If the highest equilibrium (; z) is an interior point, then
d
di
> 0 and d

dj
< 0
where i = s; A;  and j = ; v:
dz
di
> 0 and dz

dj
< 0
The e¤ects of a change in the tax rate  are ambiguous.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. For example, an increase in
s raises the cost of tax evasion and hence z: Given the strategic complementarity, 
increases as well. An increase in A; on the other hand, raises the e¢ ciency of public
education and hence : The e¤ect on z follows again from the strategic complementarity
of the two actions. Finally, an increase in the tax rate has ambiguous e¤ects, because,
on the one hand, it raises the incentives for tax evasion but, on the other, it increases
spending on education and thus the human capital of the next generation.
Corollary 1. If v > 0 then changes in the policy instruments, i.e., changes in  ; s or ,
cannot eliminate the high corruption equilibrium (0; 0).
As long as some of the knowledge is transferred freely to the new generations, then the
politician may peculate all the public funds. Anticipating that, citizens may declare zero
income.
Overall, it is interesting to note that in a context where corruption may corrupt, multi-
ple self-fullling equilibria may arise that cannot be eliminated via the use of policy. This
can explain why corruption may persist. In the following section, we enrich the bench-
mark model to examine whether standard policies are e¤ective in eliminating endemic
corruption.
3 Enforcement Policy
In this section we analyze standard deterrence policies. Accordingly, suppose that both
citizens and the politician are faced with a certain probability of being audited. To keep
the analysis simple, in the main text, we assume exogenous auditing probabilities and
nes.16 If they are audited, then their illegal action is revealed and they are punished
with a ne.
16In Appendix A.2 we attempt to endogenize the auditing probabilities.
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More specically, let p denote the expected penalty rate, i.e., p equals the probability
of being audited times the penalty rate. Then, the budget constraint of each citizen is
cct = [(1  zt)  st(1  zt)2   p(1  zt)]ht: (10)
The rst term inside the brackets on the right-hand side of (10), (1 zt)ht; is the citizens
disposable income; she has income ht and pays taxes equal to zht: The second term,
st(1  zt)2ht; is the transaction cost of tax evasion. Finally, the last term, p(1  zt)ht;
is the expected penalty, which is proportional to the evaded tax as in Yitzhaki (1974).17
Moreover, as it is common in this literature, e.g., Chen (2003), we assume that the tax
evasion gamble is better than fair, i.e., p  1:18
Similarly, the politician, if found to have embezzled pubic funds, pays a ne that is
proportional to the embezzled amount.19 We let q denote the expected punishment rate.
Hence, the politicians budget constraint is
cpt = (1  t)NztHt   q(1  t)NztHt: (11)
It may be recalled that the total tax revenue collected within a period t is Rt = NztHt:
Equation (11) sets the consumption of a politician, cpt; equal to his salary, (1 )Rt; plus
the embezzled amount of public funds, (1 t)Rt; minus the expected ne, q(1 t)Rt:
As is the case with citizens, the embezzlement gamble is assumed to be better than fair,
i.e., q  1:
The law of motion of human capital is still given by (1) and Et is again given by (3).20
3.1 Individual optimization
Citizens
17Imposing nes on evaded income, following Allingham and Sandmo (1972), leads to qualitatively
similar results.
18The case where the opposite holds is of little interest, since tax evasion would never take place. The
assumption that the evasion gamble is better than fair, is empirically supported; see, for example, Skinner
and Slemrod (1985). The most plausible interpretation of this is that the penalty rate is greater than
one, the probability of inspection is less than one, and the product of the two also less than.
19In Appendix A.2 we analyze an extreme case of penalty, where a corrupt politician has zero con-
sumption (he is thrown out of o¢ ce). As we show, our results remain qualitatively the same.
20In Appendix A.2, we analyze also the case where the revenue from the nes imposed on tax dodgers
and corrupt politicians is spent on public education. Once again, our results remain essentially unaltered.
In fact, as mentioned above in footnote 15, multiple equilibria arise even if v = 0:
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The individual optimization problem solved by each citizen at time t is that of max-
imizing (4) subject to (10) and the non-negativity constraints, taking Ht; Et; and hence
ht+1; and t as given. To simplify the algebra, in the remainder of the paper we assume
that  = 1: Maximization yields
zt = f(t) =
8>><>>:
0 if   2st
1 p
1  (1 p)
2st
if  < 2st
1 p :
(12)
As in the benchmark model, the politiciansembezzlement rate is a strategic complement
for citizenstax evasion rate, meaning that zt is an increasing function of t: The general
properties of the reaction function are similar to the those of the benchmark model.
Moreover, when we compare the interior solution with the one in the benchmark model,
we observe that for the same value of t, the evasion rate zt is lower.
The Politician
The politician maximizes (7) subject to (11), the non-negativity constraints and equa-
tions (1) and (3), taking zt and Ht as given. Maximization yields
t = g(zt) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if NAzt(1  q)  (1  q)v
NAzt(1 q) v(1 q)
2NAzt(1 q) if NAzt(1  2+ q) < (1  q)v < NAzt(1  q)
1 if (1  q)v  NAzt(1  2+ q):
(13)
Simple di¤erentiation shows that dt=dzt > 0 and hence private citizens action is a
strategic complement for the politician. The general properties of the reaction function
are similar to the those of the benchmark model. Moreover, when we compare the interior
solution with the one in the benchmark model, we observe that for the same value of zt,
the embezzlement rate t is lower.
3.2 Equilibrium
The denition of equilibrium remains basically the same as that in Denition 1. Also,
following exactly the same steps as in Proposition 1 we can show the existence of an
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equilibrium in this version of the model as well. For a wide range of parameter values
there exist three equilibria, one corner and two interior or one interior and two corner.
The stability of the equilibria is the same as in the benchmark model, namely the lowest
(full tax evasion and full corruption) and the highest (low tax evasion and low corrup-
tion) equilibria are stable, whereas the intermediate equilibrium is unstable. Crucially
while deterrence policies are successful in reducing corruption and tax evasion in the low
corruption equilibrium still though the multiplicity persists.
The intuition behind this result lies in that deterrence policies can a¤ect agentsde-
cision with respect to their own budget constraint since they simply render evasion or
embezzlement more costly. Still though they fail to treat the problem arising due to
presence of strategic interactions. No matter how high a ne or an auditing probability
is, whenever agents expect other agents to be corrupt, they always nd it optimal to be
corrupt as well.21
The argument advanced by this section is that deterrence policies are limited in scope
if they are the only means employed in the ght against corruption. If the economy
coordinates to the low corruption equilibrium, then this will be a better equilibrium than
the one without deterrence. However, so long as the policy does not break the strategic
compementarity in corrupt actions, there is no guarantee that the economy will coordinate
to the good equilibrium. No matter how high the expected nes will be, it might always be
benecial for one group to remain corrupt if the other group remains corrupt too. Despite
the inherent di¢ culties in quantifying these policies, the fact that a number of developed
countries such as EU members, which not only have advanced deterrence systems but are
also part of a union that provides general guidelines for the ght against corruption,22
exhibit very di¤erent outcomes, is suggestive of the fact that di¤erent countries may
coordinate to di¤erent equilibria.
21One can argue that since the government knows the amount of tax revenue and since all taxpayers
are identical, it could easily observe that all taxpayers evade and thus set p = 1: To justify a probability
of detection lower than unity we could either introduce a fraction of honest taxpayers (which would
unnecessarily complicate our results) or assume that p denotes the probability that the true evasion rate
is revealed (Andreoni et al, 1998).
22http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/gpes/media3/documents/3842_EN_richard_murphy_eu_tax
_gap_en_120229.pdf
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4 Norms, Morals and Values
One of the main reasons that may prevent a society from coordinating around the low
corruption and low tax evasion equilibrium is the luck of trust, which seems to be present
in many societies. In a context where some form of legitimization of corrupt norms
prevails, it seems natural to resort to a strengthening of the morals of the society in an
e¤ort to mitigate the strategic complementarity e¤ects. This strengthening of the morals
of the society can actually lead to better enforcement of standard deterrence policies.23
4.1 Social Stigma Cost
Following, Kim (2003) among others, we postulate that when law-breaking agents are
traced, they su¤er a disutility from being revealed as cheaters. To keep the analysis
simple we assume that there are no nes for tax dodgers and corrupt politicians. We seek
to examine whether coordination can be achieved if suitable values are inculcated upon
agents.
Citizens
Each citizens utility function is now modied as follows:
max
cct ;zt
cctht+1   Ht(1  zt)ht: (14)
The last term in (14) captures the expected size of the moral cost if the citizens gets caught.
This term depends positively on the total tax that the delinquent evaded, (1   z)ht.
Analytically, the expected marginal cost of breaking the law is Ht: The parameter  > 0
is of special interest because it measures the expected punishment that the society inicts
upon law-breaking activities. It is inuenced by the level of moral values in the society,
i.e., the societys sensitivity to tax evasion, as well as the probability of being caught.24
23The notion of morals is not new in the economics literature and has been widely used in various
contexts. For example, Mo¢ t (1983) and Besley and Coate (1992) analyze the case where there is a
moral stigma for people who participate in welfare programs. In the tax evasion literature the notion was
rst introduced by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Recently, Kim (2003) has analyzed the case where
society views tax evasion as an ignominious behavior and places a social stigma upon agents that are
disclosed as tax evaders. Alm and Torgler (2011) suggest several alternative ways by which the theory of
tax compliance can be extended to incorporate ethics.
24We implicitly assume that the moral cost is an intrinsic cost (see, among others, Gordon 1989 and
Benabou and Tirole 2003) not associated with other groupsbehavior. In an extension of the model we
have associated individual cost with other groupsbehavior (following the rationale we adopted for the
transaction cost) and found qualitatively similar results.
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Furthermore, we assume that the expected marginal moral cost depends on the average
level of human capital, Ht. There is a technical reason behind this assumption. Without
this, as the levels of human capital and income grow over time, the expected marginal
benet from breaking the law increases, whereas the expected marginal cost remains
constant. As a result, after a certain level of human capital, the expected marginal
benet outweighs the marginal cost and the moral cost becomes irrelevant. Nevertheless,
we think that this may not be an inappropriate assumption, since di¤erent societies may
judge the same unlawful act in a di¤erent manner. For example, poor societies may be
more tolerant towards tax evasion and not view it as unethical. In any case, even if we
drop this assumption, our results below still hold for low levels of human capital, or if
the level of human capital remains constant over time (i.e., a steady-state equilibrium in
levels instead of the growth rates).
A citizen maximizes (14) subject to (5) and the non-negativity constraints, taking t;
Et and Ht as given. The citizensbest response function is now far more complicated.
It is given in an implicit form in Appendix A.2. Moreover, the nature of the interaction
between citizens and the politician is not clear any more. Specically, for low values of
; we have that dzt=dt is unambiguously positive as before, i.e., the politicians action
is denitely a strategic complement for the citizens (the threshold value of  is given in
Appendix A.2). Nevertheless, for high value of ; when the e¤ect of moral cost is strong,
the politicians action may become a strategic complement for citizens.
The Politician
The politicians optimization problem at time t is now given by
max
cpt ;t
cptht+1   Ht(1  t)NztHt; (15)
subject to the budget constraint (8), the standard non-negativity constraints and equa-
tions (1) and (3), taking zt and Ht as given. The moral cost term in (15) is completely
analogous to the one introduced above in citizensutility (equation 14). First, it depends
positively on the size of the fraud (1   t)NztHt: Second, the expected marginal cost
Ht depends positively on the average human capital. Finally, for simplicity, we assume
that the value of  is the same with that in the citizensproblem.
Maximization yields the solution
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t = g(zt) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if NAzt  v   
NAzt+ v
2NAzt
if NAzt(1  2) < v    < NAzt
1 if v    < NAzt(1  2):
(16)
Notice that for values of  below v; dt=dzt > 0 as before. Nevertheless, for values
of  above v; dt=dzt < 0; namely, the citizensaction is a strategic substitute for the
politician. This means that if the stigma cost for following an unlawful action is high
enough, then the politician does not wish any more to respond positively to the action of
the citizens; instead he attempts to improve the situation by choosing to be more honest.
The denition of equilibrium is similar to that in the previous versions. Notice that
if we set  = 0; then this version collapses to the benchmark model. More generally,
for su¢ ciently small values of  we get the same results as in the benchmark model:
For su¢ ciently high values of ; however, the action of the politician may be a strategic
substitute for the citizens and vice versa. We illustrate this case in the following example.
Example 2. Let AN = 2;  = 0:7;  = 0:4; v = 0:04; s = 0:8; and  = 0:1: Then the
best response functions have the properties shown in Figure 4. Moreover, there exists a
unique interior equilibrium: (; z) = (0:782; 0:790):
We can conclude that a stigma cost is possible to eliminate the multiplicity of equi-
libria. Contrary to simple deterrence policies, a stigma cost that is high enough alters
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agentsbehavior, since each agents action may now be a strategic substitute, instead of
a strategic complement, to other agents.25
As mentioned above, the parameter ; which enters in the expected marginal moral
cost, depends on two terms: the level of moral values in the society and the probability of
being caught. The rst is the result of education, anti-corruption campaigns and public
exhortation, while the second is a policy instrument. Nevertheless, both of these factors
are crucial for the e¤ectiveness of social stigma and one cannot work without the other.
4.2 Discussion
A critique of our results could be that we exogenously assume that agents su¤er from
moral costs if they get caught cheating. This would be true taking into account that
the establishment of internal moral costs, if feasible, is a long-term solution, since it
requires a change in agentsattitudes and tastes. However, our purpose is to examine
the e¤ectiveness of various policies on the deterrence of corruption assuming they are
successfully implemented. Whether a policy will be successfully implemented or not
depends on many factors that cannot be easily accounted for in a model, not even for
standard policies such as nes and auditing probabilities. We have therefore followed
the standard morals literature (see, Mo¢ t 1983; Gordon 1989; Besley and Coate 1992;
Kim 2003) and assumed that if an agent is audited and exposed as an evader (embezzler)
she su¤ers from an internal moral cost. Interestingly we found that in the presence of
a su¢ ciently high cost we can eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria. The mechanism
behind our results is breaking the social legitimizatione¤ect and rendering the strategies
of the players strategic substitutes. Strategic substitutability implies that it is too costly
for agents to follow the other agentsactions.
Anti-corruption campaigns are often employed by countries in the ght against cor-
ruption and aim at increasing awareness and sensitiveness of the public. One of the
rst nation-wide anti-corruption campaign was the so-called San Fan (the Three Anti)
that was initiated in China in 1951. The three antispromoted were anti-corruption,
anti-waste and anti-bureaucracy. The Three AntiCampaign was followed by the Five
AntiCampaign that was launched in 1952 and promoted anti-bribery, anti-theft of state
25Note that this simplifying formulation aims at highlighting the role of stigmatizing o¤enders when
implementing anti-corruption policies. Evidently if a deterrence policy involves both a pecuniary and a
non-pecuniary (stigma) cost, then we would obtain qualitatively similar results. Specically, we could
still eliminate multiplicity, but this would be the outcome of the stigmatizing e¤ect of the policy.
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property, anti-tax evasion, anti-cheating on government contracts and anti-stealing state
economic information (Spence, 1991). All citizens and particularly members of the Chi-
nese Communist Party were mobilized to inspect and report corrupt activities. O¤enders
were widely exposed and in some instances severely punished. The outcome of the rst
campaign was a signicant decrease in corruption; thus, it can be inferred that the policy
was initially successful. Nevertheless, the second campaign was eventually misused as
an action against political opponents and was eventually abandoned without signicant
achievements (see, Spence, 1991).
In India a tax amnesty took place in 1997, which was highly successful and brought a
substantial increase in revenue, mostly because the state had hired two marketing compa-
nies that used moral suasion to increase tax compliance (Torgler, 2004). To increase peer
pressure on tax evaders, governments often make publicly available the tax lling reports
or publicize cases of tax evasion. For example, in Sweden, Norway and Finland personal
income tax llings are publicly available (see Lenter et al., 2003).26 In California, on the
other hand, the names of the top 500 delinquent taxpayers are published on the internet
annually.27 Also, the U.S. Attorneys o¢ ce in the district where a case is prosecuted nor-
mally issues a press release when a tax evader is indicted, once he or she is convicted, and
again when the evader is sentenced(Gray, 1999). In New Zealand the Commissioner of
Inland Revenue regularly releases the Tax Evaders Gazette,which lists those taxpayers,
individuals and companies, who have been prosecuted, had penal tax or shortfall penalties
imposed for evading their tax obligations (see Lenter et al., 2003). Several other countries
follow similar practices.28 The purpose of all these actions is to increase the moral cost,
via the use of peer-pressure, and eventually to inculcate a culture of tax compliance.
26In fact, in Norway tax llings are available on the Internet for both individuals and corporations.
27See https://www.ftb.ca.gov/aboutFTB/Delinquent_Taxpayers.shtml. In fact, since the inception of
this program in 2007 and as of March 25, 2013, the State of California Franchise Tax Board has recovered
more than $216 million in revenue from taxpayers that came forward to take care of their debts.
28Interestingly, the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, an independent authority in charge of the
protection of data privacy in Greece, has recently ruled against the publication of the names of individual
delinquent taxpayers.
23
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Strategy
The empirical section of the paper is developed in two parts. In the rst part, the
analysis establishes a correlation between attitudes towards tax evasion and perceived
political corruption, highlighting the interaction derived from our theoretical analysis.
Next, we would like to ascertain that this correlation is not driven by unobservables. For
this purpose, in the second part, we use a sample of second and third generation migrants
and estimate a causal e¤ect of the mean perception of political corruption in the home
country on attitudes towards tax evasion, as expressed by migrants currently residing in
the US.
5.1.1 World Values Survey
This section establishes that, in line with our theoretical ndings, attitudes towards tax
evasion are positively correlated with the perceived level of political corruption, i.e., the
higher the extent of perceived political corruption, the more justiable citizens nd it to
cheat on taxes. Causality runs both ways and in this section we do not attempt to address
the issue of endogeneity; we just establish a positive correlation between the two, even
after controlling for a large number of individual controls as well as country and time
xed e¤ects.
In particular, we estimate the following reduced form equation:
TEijt = 1 + 2PCi + 3Xi + Ij +Yt + "ijt (17)
where TEijt is the individual responses to how justiable it is to cheat on taxes, i corre-
sponds to the individual, j denotes the country and t denotes the World Values Survey
(WVS) round during which the individual was interviewed. Xi is a vector of individual
controls (age, age square, gender, employment status), Ij is a vector of country xed
e¤ects capturing any unobservables that remain constant over time at the country level,
whereas Yt is a vector of WVS round xed e¤ects capturing any unobservable time shocks
associated with the timing of the interview. "ijt is the error term, whereas standard errors
are clustered at the country dimension.
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5.1.2 General Social Survey-Migrants Sample
This section argues that the interaction between perceived political corruption and indi-
vidual attitudes towards tax evasion, established in the previous section, is not spurious
and not driven by endogeneity. To this end, our identication strategy exploits the nat-
ural experiment of migration. In particular, we use a sample of migrants who currently
reside in the US and are thus faced with the same sociopolitical environment. In order to
mitigate the issue of selective migration and of unobservables in the home country, we use
the sample of second and third generation migrants, who were not selected into the host
country and have no interaction with their origin country, other than the culture instilled
to them by their parents. Thus, any di¤erences that we pick among attitudes of migrants
are primarily driven by cultural di¤erences among them (see Fernandez and Fogli 2009;
Luttmer and Singhal 2011).
We estimate the following equation:
TEiot = 1 + 2PCo + 3Xi +Yt + "iot (18)
where TEiot is the individual response as to how justiable it is to cheat on taxes, i
corresponds to the individual, o denotes the country of origin and t denotes the General
Social Survey (GSS) round during which the individual was interviewed. Xi is a vector
of individual controls (age, age square, gender, employment status), and Yt is a vector
of GSS round xed e¤ects capturing any unobservable time shocks associated with the
timing of the interview. "iot is the error term, whereas standard errors are clustered at
the country of origin dimension.
5.2 The Data
The empirical section adopts individual data from two survey data sets, the World Values
Survey and the General Social Survey.
5.2.1 World Values Survey
The rst part of the analysis, which establishes a correlation between political corrup-
tion and tax evasion, uses two waves from the WVS for which the full set of controls is
available, namely, the 1994-1999 round and the 2005-2007 round. The sample includes
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N = 54555 individuals from 45 countries. The countries employed in the sample are Al-
bania, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Belarus, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Sal-
vador, Estonia, Finland, FYROM, Georgia, Germany, India, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico,
Moldova, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russian
Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
We focus on two main questions from the WVS. The rst question is How widespread
do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?and is related to the extent
of political corruption (as perceived by individuals). The variable is ranked from 1 to 4
with 1 denoting Almost no o¢ cials involved in it and 4 denoting Almost all public
o¢ cials are involved in it.
The second question, which is related to tax evasion, is Please tell me for each of
the following statements whether you think it can always be justied, never be justied,
or something in between, using this card: Justiable to cheat on taxes. The variable
is ranked from 1 to 10 with 1 denoting Never justiable and 10 denoting Always
justiable.
Interestingly, both variables reect perceptions of corruption as well as the extent
of legitimization associated with corruption. The additional controls included are the
age of the respondent, the gender, educational level, religious group and other individual
variables available from the WVS.
5.2.2 General Social Survey
The second part of the empirical analysis, which seeks to address the issue of endogeneity,
employs the sample of migrants from the General Social Survey (GSS) data set. The GSS
spans over the period 1972-2012 and is conducted annually. The survey, among other
things, provides information as to the ethnic origin of the participating individuals. Our
analysis exploits only the sample of second and third generation migrants (rst generation
migrants are excluded to mitigated the concern of omitted variable bias and selection).
In particular there are N = 197 migrants from 16 countries for which the full set of
controls is available, namely, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Mexico,
Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the UK.
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Table 1: Countries of Origin of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Generation Migrants
Family Origin Frequency Family Origin Frequency
Czech Rep. 10 Portugal
Germany 58 Puerto Rico 3
Hungary 7 Romania 2
Lithuania 3 Russia 17
Mexico 15 Spain
Norway 12 Sweden 5
Philippines 1 Switzerland 1
Poland 30 UK 33
Total 197
Summary: The table lists the countries of origin for the
sample of second and third generation migrants, as well as
the number of migrants coming from each source country.
In order to identify the second and third generation migrants, we use two questions
from the GSS on how many parents and grandparents were born in the US. The question
on parentsorigin is ranked as follows: 0 if both parents of the migrant are born in the
US, 1 if only the mother was born in the US and 2 if only the migrants father was born
in the US. This questions allows us to identify the second generation migrants.
The variable on the origin of grandparents takes the value of 0 if all grandparents were
born in the US, the value 1 if at least one was born outside the US, 2 if two were born
outside the US, 3 if three were born outside the US and 4 if all four grandparents were
born outside the US. The combination of these two variables allows us to trace migrants
up to four generations. Therefore, second generation migrants are those who were born in
the US and at least one parent was born abroad and all grandparents were born abroad.
Third generation migrants are those who were born in the US, whose parents were born
in the US and at least two grandparents were born abroad.
To trace the ethnic origin of the individuals, we use the question that asks them to
rank the three ethnic origins to which they feel closer too. We always use as the ethnic
origin of the individual his/her rst choice.
The question that is related to the attitudes of migrants towards corruption is phrased
as It is wrong to cheat on taxes. The variable takes values from 1 to 4 with 1 denoting
seriously wrongand 4 denoting not wrong.
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5.3 Findings
5.3.1 World Values Survey
Column (1) of Table 2 regresses individual attitudes of tax evasion on the perceived
level of corruption of politicians without using any controls and thus exploiting cross
country variation. The coe¢ cient is positive and highly signicant, thereby uncovering
the interaction between political corruption (as perceived by individuals) and individual
attitudes towards tax evasion. Column (2) introduces into the analysis country and
WVS round xed e¤ects to capture any unobservables associated with the country or
the year during which the survey has been conducted and thus exploiting within country
variation. Although the coe¢ cient decreases somewhat in magnitude, yet it remains highly
signicant. Column (3) introduces into the analysis exogenous individual controls such
as age and a quadratic term on age as well as gender. Finally, Column (4) introduces
controls for the income and the educational level of the individual. Reassuringly, the
results remain intact and the coe¢ cients remain basically constant.
Overall the ndings of Table 2 conrm the theoretical predictions of our analysis, i.e.,
that political corruption interacts with tax evasion. The table provides mere correlations,
which, nevertheless, indicate that the two e¤ects feedback on each other and can drive
countries into a vicious circle where di¤erent forms of corruption interact with one another.
5.3.2 General Social Survey
The theoretical predictions of the model highlight the interaction and thus the correlation
between the two forms of corruption. Yet, it is crucial to make sure that the correlation
highlighted in the previous section does not pick up the e¤ect of any unobservables. That
is why, in this section, we attempt to establish the causal e¤ect of perceived political
corruption on individual attitudes towards tax evasion.
Table 3 illustrates the results of regressing individual attitudes with respect to tax
evasion on the mean value of the perceived level of corruption of politicians in the origin
country. Column (1) does not introduce any controls. The coe¢ cient is positive and highly
signicant, thereby uncovering the interaction between political corruption (as perceived
by individuals) and individual attitudes towards tax evasion. Column (2) introduces
into the analysis individual controls, such as gender and age as well as GSS round xed
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Table 2: Interpersonal Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Justiable to Cheat on Taxes
Corruption of Politicians 0.212*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.117***
(0.060) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033)
Age -0.023*** -0.026***
(0.006) (0.006)
Age Square 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
WVS Round FE No Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes Yes
Income No No No Yes
Education No No No Yes
No. of Countries 45 45 45 45
Obs. 54555 54555 54555 54555
R-sq. 0.006 0.081 0.098 0.108
Summary: This table establishes that the more corrupt politi-
cians are perceived to be, the more individuals justify tax
evasion. The analysis controls for individual characteristics
such as age, age square, gender, educational level and in-
come as well as for country and WVS round xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The question on the extent of political corruption (as
perceived by individuals) is captured by the question How widespread
do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?. The
variable is ranked from 1 to 4 with 1 denoting Almost no o¢ cials
involved in it and 4 denoting Almost all public o¢ cials are involved
in it; (ii) the question related to tax evasion is Please tell me for
each of the following statements whether you think it can always be
justied, never be justied, or something in between, using this card:
Justiable to cheat on taxes. The variable is ranked from 1 to 10 with
1 denoting Never justiableand 10 denoting Always justiable; (iii)
robust standard error estimates, clustered at the country dimension, are
reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all
for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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e¤ects. Column (3) introduces into the analysis additional exogenous individual controls,
such as income and education. Column (4) controls for maternal and paternal education
to capture potential e¤ects associated with the transmission channel, i.e., the transmission
of culture from parents to children. Reassuringly, the results remain largely intact both
in magnitude and in signicance, conrming the causal e¤ect of political corruption on
tax evasion.
Finally, Column (5) extends the analysis to the full sample of migrants. Although this
comes at the expense of exogeneity, since it incorporates rst generation migrants, it has
the advantage that it raises the size of the sample. As shown in Table 3, the coe¢ cient
remains signicant at the 5% level despite the fact that the sample also allows for the
presence of fourth generation migrants where the transmission is weaker.
Overall, the ndings of Table 3 conrm the theoretical predictions of our analysis, as
well as the ndings of the previous section, i.e., that political corruption interacts with
tax evasion. By using the sample of second and third generation migrants, the analysis
ensures that the result is not driven by unobservables.
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Table 3: Interpersonal Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Justiable to Cheat on Taxes
Mean Political Corruption (Origin Country) 0.410*** 0.415** 0.400** 0.416*** 0.211**
(0.123) (0.163) (0.142) (0.138) (0.084)
Age -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.004
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008)
Age Square 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GSS Round FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income No No Yes Yes Yes
Education No No No Yes Yes
Paternal-Maternal Education No No No Yes Yes
All Migrants No No No No Yes
No. of Origin Countries 15 15 15 15 17
Obs. 197 197 197 197 750
R-sq. 0.038 0.066 0.069 0.077 0.014
Summary: This table establishes that the more corrupt politicians are perceived
to be at the origin country, the more individuals justify tax evasion in the host
country. The analysis controls for individual characteristics such as age, age
square, gender, educational level and income as well as GSS round xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The question on the mean level of political corruption (as perceived by in-
dividuals)comes from the WVS and is captured by the question How widespread do
you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?. The variable is ranked from
1 to 4 with 1 denoting Almost no o¢ cials involved in it and 4 denoting Almost all
public o¢ cials are involved in it. The analysis uses the mean level for each country of
origin; (ii) the question that is related to the attitudes of migrants towards corruption
is It is wrong to cheat on taxes. The variable takes values from 1 to 4 with 1 denoting
seriously wrong and 4 denoting not wrong; (iii) robust standard error estimates,
clustered at the country dimension, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statis-
tical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent
level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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6 Summary and Conclusions
Motivated by the ongoing Greek economic tragedy,which we partly view as the out-
come of strategic complementarities in corrupt actions among di¤erent societal groups,
we analyzed the issues of political corruption and tax evasion in the context of a simple
economy with a publicly provided good. We showed that strategic complementarities
may arise among agents, which lead to the existence of two stable equilibria. One of
these equilibria is characterized by high rates of corruption and tax evasion and a low
level of the public good, while the other equilibrium exhibits low rates of corruption and
tax evasion and a high level of public good provision. These results are robust to various
extensions of the basic model.
Naturally, we made a number of simplifying assumptions in order to keep the model
analytically tractable. For example, we assumed homogeneity among all agents, which
resulted in all of them being tax evaders. At the expense of simplicity, one could assume
that there is a continuum of agents, who di¤er with respect to, for example, the trans-
action cost parameter of tax evasion. In such a case, the equilibrium tax evasion rate
di¤ers among agents. Nevertheless, the social interactions and the emergence of strategic
complementarity, which is one of our main points, will still be present. Also, the assump-
tion of a single politician bears little importance, as long as they act as a groupand
they realize the consequences of their actions on the provision of the public good. Finally,
we assumed that an amount of the single public good occurred naturally, or without
government provision. We view this as a realistic assumption, since, as it is widely ac-
cepted, young people learn not only through formal education, but also through social
interactions. More importantly, however, as we showed in the Appendix, our results hold
even if we dispense with this assumption, as long as some of the amount raised from nes
on tax evaders is spent on education and is not wasted.
We also provided empirical support for the main aforementioned result. More speci-
cally, using data from the World Values Survey, we established empirically a correlation
between attitudes towards tax evasion and perceived political corruption. Moreover, the
immigrant analysis based on the General Social Survey showed that this is not a spurious
correlation or a result driven by endogeneity.
Our paper went beyond the simple establishment of multiple equilibria. It investigated
the ability of di¤erent policies to eliminate the multiplicity and resolve the coordination
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failure. To this extent, we showed rst that standard deterrence policies, i.e., changes
in the probabilities of being caught or in the penalty rates, are not able to eliminate
the multiplicity of equilibria. Next, we analyzed the issue of social coordination in the
presence of a moral cost imposed on law-breaking agents. We demonstrated that such
a cost, if strong enough, can lead to a unique equilibrium. Of course, this result is also
consistent with a variety of similar approaches that go beyond enforcement to incorporate
trust and other similar notions, e.g., intrinsic motivation, tax morale, slippery slope,
deference versus deance, etc. We used the concept of stigma to illustrate our point
that the establishment of strong moral values is a necessary supplement to deterrence
policies.
Finally, our result on the importance of social values accords well with the argument
advanced in the literature regarding trust as one of three paradigms for government
administrative policies (see Alm 2012).29 Accordingly, individuals are more likely to
respond either to enforcement or services if they believe that the tax administration is
honest; that is, trust in the authorities can have a positive impact on compliance.
Nevertheless, we think that in practice the establishment of such a trust in societies with
a high level of corruption is extremely di¢ cult. Hence, these results can explain the
persistence of corruption and tax evasion and the di¢ culty that often honest leaders face
when trying to eradicate them.
29The other two paradigms are: a) an enforcementparadigm, where the emphasis is on the control of
illegal behavior through frequent audits and excessively high nes, and b) a serviceparadigm, in which
the tax administration acts as a facilitator and as a provider of services to taxpayers (see Alm 2012).
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Appendix
(This Appendix is not intended for publication)
In Section A we present the proofs of the propositions and the corollary (Subsection A.1)
as well as some extensions of our model (Subsection A.2). In Section B we explain in
detail the denitions of the variables that we used in our empirical analysis and state our
sources.
A Proofs and Extensions
A.1 Proofs of Propositions and the Corollary
Proof of Proposition 1
We must establish the existence of a pair (zt; t) that satises equations (6) and (9)
simultaneously, after z = z is imposed in (9). For an arbitrary time period t, let zt = f(t)
denote the solution to each citizens problem, as described by equation (6); for each value
of the embezzlement rate t there exists a unique value of the evasion rate zt: Similarly,
let t = g(zt) denote the solution to the politicians problem, as described by equation
(9). Note that both of these functions are continuous (see equations (6) and (9)). Thus,
the composite function g  f from [0; 1] to [0; 1] is continuous and, by Browers xed point
theorem, has a xed point.
Proof of Proposition 2
a) If v = 0, then simple substitution in equation (9) shows that the politicians optimal
response is independent of the citizens actions. More specically, t = =[(1 + )]:
Substituting this value in (6), yields zt = 1  [(1 + )=2s]: b) Similarly, if s = 0, then
each citizens best response is independent of the politicians action. Indeed, substituting
s = 0; equation (6) yields zt = 0: The equilibrium value of t = 0 follows then from
equation (9). c) If v  A; then the politicians best response function coincides with
the side of the unit square that lies on the vertical axis (see Figure 1, where the best
response functions are indicated by bold lines). The only common point then with the
citizensbest response function is (0; 0): Similarly, if   2s then the citizensbest response
function coincides with the side of the unit square that lies on the horizontal axis. Hence,
the only common point with the politicians best response is (0; 0):
Proof of Proposition 3
a) The proof follows immediately from equations (6) and (9). b) Notice that if v > 0;
then the point (0; 0) satises both equations (6) and (9). c) The proof follows immediately
from Figure 2 and equations (6) and (9).
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Proof of Proposition 4
The results follow directly after di¤erentiating (6) and (9).
Proof of Corollary 1
It follows trivially from Proposition 3(b), where it is shown that if v > 0 then (0; 0) is
always an equilibrium.
Results Regarding the Case of Stigma
Citizens
Maximizing (14) subject to (5) and the non-negativity constraints, cc > 0 and 1 > z >
0; taking t, Et and Ht as given, yields that the part of the best response function that
lies strictly between zero and one is given by the positive root of the following quadratic
equation in z
2sA2z2 + ( 2A  2sA+ 2sv)z + v   2sv   = 0: (A.1)
Tedious calculations show that if
 <
(A)2(2s   2) + 4sv( 2A  svA  sv)
8s 2A
;
the politicians action is unambiguously a strategic complement for the citizens, i.e.,
dz=d > 0.
A.2 Extensions of the Model
An Alternative Punishment Scheme for the Politician
In this subsection we analyze an alternative punishment scheme for the politician, namely,
if the politician is caught to have peculated public funds, then he is thrown out of o¢ ce
and receives zero consumption. More specically, the utility function of the politician is
now
(1  q)(cptht+1); (A.2)
where cp is given by (8). Maximizing (A.2) subject to (8), (1), (3) and the non-negativity
constraints, cp > 0 and 1 >  > 0; taking zt and Ht as given, leads to the same best
response function as in the benchmark model (equation 9). Moreover, each citizens
problem is the same as the one analyzed in Section 3 and hence her best response function
is again given by equation (12).
Obviously, the results in this case are very similar to the ones obtained in the bench-
mark model as well as in the model with nes (Section 3). For a wide range of parameter
values there exist three equilibria. Moreover, if v > 0; then changes in the policy para-
meters, e.g., p; q;  ; and ; cannot eliminate the high corruption equilibrium.
2
Revenue from Fines are Allocated to the Public Good
In the main text we assume that the revenue from nes on tax dodgers and the
politician is neutralized. Next, we analyze the case where this revenue is used to nance
public education. Accordingly, equation (3), which gives the level of spending on public
education, changes to
Et = tNztHt + p(1  zt)NHt + q(1  t)NztHt; (A.3)
where p(1   zt)NHt and q(1   t)NztHt represent the expected revenue from nes
imposed on tax evaders and the politician, respectively.
Each citizens problem does not change and her best response is again given by equa-
tion (12). Following the same steps as in Section 3, we nd the politicians best response
to be
t = g(zt) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if NAz(1 + p  2q)  v + pNA
NA [zt(1+p) p 2qz] v
2Azt(1 q) if NAz(1 + p  2) < v + pNA < NAz(1 + p  2q)
1 if v + pNA  NAz(1 + p  2):
(A.4)
Simple di¤erentiation shows that dt=dzt is positive and hence private citizensaction is a
strategic complement for the politician. Once again, for a wide range of parameter values
there exist three equilibria, one corner and two interior or one interior and two corner.
These equilibria have the same stability properties as in the benchmark model, namely
the lowest (high tax evasion and high corruption) and the highest (low tax evasion and
low corruption) equilibria are stable, whereas the intermediate equilibrium is unstable.
Note however that, in contrast to the other versions of the model, in this case strategic
complementarity and multiple equilibria can arise even if v; the rate of human capital
transferred freely to the next generation, is zero. The reason behind this result is that,
even if zt or t is zero, there will still be some acquisition of human capital nanced by the
nes on tax evaders and corrupt politicians. As before, there does not exist a policy that
can eliminate multiplicity. More specically, since the point (0; 0) satises both equations
(12) and (A.4), changes in the policy parameters, e.g., p; q;  ; and ; cannot eliminate
the high corruption equilibrium.
Endogenous Probabilities
In our last extension, we attempt to endogenize the probabilities that agents face. More
specically, we assume that citizens choose the percentage of their income that they report
to the tax authorities and face a probability of being audited equal to qct: If audited, their
true income is revealed and they pay a penalty  on evaded income tax. The politician, on
the other hand, peculates an amount t of the tax revenue earmarked for public education.
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Nevertheless, there is a technical relation qpt = t between the embezzlement rate and
the probability to be caught, i.e., the more the politician peculates, the more likely he will
get caught;  2 (0; 1) is an institutional parameter (see Allingham and Sandmo, 1972).
For simplicity, we assume, that if the politician gets caught having peculated funds, then
he is thrown out o¢ ce and consumes nothing. Moreover, in equilibrium qc = qpt = q; that
is, the probability of being caught is the same for all agents, or the law is applied equally
to all.30 The human capital accumulation and the expenditure on public education are
still given by (1) and (3).
Citizens face essentially the same problem as in Section 3 and their best response
function is
zt = f(qt) =
8>><>>:
0 if   2sqt
(1 qt)
1  (1 q)
2sqt
if  < 2sqt
(1 qt) :
(A.5)
Simple di¤erentiation yields dzt=dqt > 0:
The politicians problem can be represented as one where he chooses cpt and qpt to
maximize
max
cpt;qpt
(1  qpt)(cptht+1); (A.6)
subject to (8), the non-negativity constraints, and equations (1) and (3), taking zt and
Ht as given. This leads to the following best response function
qt =
8<: 0 if zt 
v(+)
NA
g(zt) if
v(+)
NA
< zt
(A.7)
where
zt = g
 1(qt) =
v
NA
  2q+ 
3q2  2q(+ ) + :
For a wide range of parameter values there exist three equilibria, the origin and two
internal. For example if A  N = 2;  = 0:4;  = s = 0:9; v = 0:04;  = 0:7;  = 1:01;
then the three equilibria (q; z) are (0; 0); (0:184; 0:113) and (0:337; 0:609): Importantly,
changes in ;  ; and  cannot eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria:
This extension is more interesting since it endogenizes policy and answers the ques-
tion concerning who will enforce policy and for what reason. Evidently the presence of
30This is a simplifying assumption since the politicians are the ones choosing the auditing probabilities
in the economy. The aim of this assumption is to highlight that even in the case of endogenous auditing
probabilities multiplicity of equilibria cannot be eliminated. Alternatively, we could assume that the
politician chooses di¤erent auditing probabilities for himself and for the citizens without qualitatively
changing our results. We believe though that it is not an implausible assumption, since in most democratic
societies laws are equally applicable to anyone.
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strategic interactions and the fear that citizens will respond to politiciansembezzle-
ment with higher evasion is a su¢ cient reason to enforce positive auditing probabilities
However, as was the case in the benchmark model, not even endogenous policy can elim-
inate multiple equilibria since it does not resolve the problem that arises due to strategic
complementarity.
B Variable Denitions and Sources
B.1 World Values Survey
Outcome Variables
Tax Evasion. The question related to tax evasion is Please tell me for each of the following
statements whether you think it can always be justied, never be justied, or something in
between, using this card: Justiable to cheat on taxes. The variable is ranked from 1 to 10
with 1 denoting Never justiableand 10 denoting Always justiable.
Controls
Political Corruption. The question on the extent of political corruption (as perceived by indi-
viduals) is captured by the question How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption
is in this country? The variable is ranked from 1 to 4 with 1 denoting Almost no o¢ cials
involved in itand 4 denoting Almost all public o¢ cials are involved in it.
Age. The age of the respondent. The age is taken from the four waves (1981-2002) of the WVS
sample.
Gender. The gender of the respondent. The gender is taken from the four waves (1981-2002)
of the WVS sample.
Income. The variables captures the income of individuals and is divided in 10 categories with
1 denoting Lower Stepand 10 denoting Tenth Step.
Level of Education. The highest level of education attained by the respondent. The ques-
tionnaire distinguishes seven di¤erent levels of education (inadequately completed elementary
education, completed (compulsory) elementary education, (compulsory) elementary education
and basic vocational qualication, secondary, intermediate vocational qualication, secondary,
intermediate general qualication, full secondary, maturity level certicate, higher education -
lower-level tertiary certicate, higher education - upper-level tertiary certicate). The data are
taken from the four waves (1981-2002) of the WVS sample.
B.2 General Social Survey
Outcome Variables
Tax Evasion. The question that is related to the attitudes of migrants towards corruption is
It is wrong to cheat on taxes. The variable takes values from 1 to 4 with 1 denoting seriously
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wrongand 4 denoting not wrong.
Controls
Political Corruption. The question on the extent of political corruption (as perceived by
individuals) comes from the WVS and is captured by the question How widespread do you
think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?The variable is ranked from 1 to 4 with
1 denoting Almost no o¢ cials involved in it and 4 denoting Almost all public o¢ cials are
involved in it. The variable is calculated as the mean value for each country.
Age. The variable indicates the age of individuals and takes values between 18-89. Age squared
is the squared value of Age.
Education. The variable on individualseducation is an ordered variable taking values from 0
to 20, denoting the highest number of years in school.
Ethnic Origin. The variable captures the ethnic origin of the family of individuals. They
can declare up to three countries of origin ordering them according to which they relate to
more. In the analysis we choose their rst response. The respondents come from 23 countries
or continents: Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great
Britain and Yugoslavia. Moreover Africa and the Arabic countries are part of the sample,
denoting the sum of all migrants of African and Arabic origin, respectively.
Gender. The variable takes the value 1 if the gender of the individual is male.
Income. The variables captures the income of individuals. It has 12 categories: 1000$, 1000$-
2999$, 3000$-3999$, 4000$-4999$, 5000$-5999$, 6000$-6999$, 7000$-7999$, 8000$-9999$, 10000$-
14999$, 15000$-19999$, 20000$-24999$, 25000$ or more.
Parents Born in the US. The question on parents origin is ranked as follows: 0 if both
parents of the migrant are born in the US, 1 if only the mother was born in the US and 2 if
only the migrants father was born in the US.
Grandparents Born in the US. The variable on the origin of grandparents takes the value 0
if all grandparents were born in the US, the value 1 if at least one was born outside the US, 2 if
two were born outside the US, 3 if three were born outside the US and 4 if all four grandparents
were born outside the US.
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